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Capital flows in the 1990’s and their sudden reversals and the resulting turmoil created in financial markets 
together with big financial losses, revived the interests in capital controls. There are inherent destabilizing factors 
in international financial system and Tobin had seen that as early as 1972 when he suggested levying a tax on 
financial transactions as a way of smoothing out destabilizing factors, even though in its original formulation it 
was not applied anywhere due to its impracticality. Various capital inflow and outflow control experiences and 
recent crisis indicated that controls, even though are only second best, can be resorted temporarily, provided that 
the time gained is productively used for making the necessary adjustments in the inconsistent policy mix that 
brought about the controls in the first place. In such a context, for countries with high domestic debt like Turkey, 
where, even the intervention itself can be a source of speculation, an exchange rate band, in which the limits of 
the band is defended through taxing the violators of the band rather than central bank intervention can be an 
alternative. Such a strategy would be beneficial if Turkey uses the time to address the structural issues, rather 
than relaxes under the protective cushion of the tax. This method is advantageous to the sterilized intervention 
presently used to decrease exchange rate volatility arising from speculative inflows, first because, it will keep the 
central bank reserves intact, second it will force the violators of the exchange rate band to share the 
responsibility of their violation. If temporary controls are very carefully coordinated with the appropriate 
supporting policies, they could replace IMF programs with financial assistance, at least till the new and 
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I. CAPITAL FLOWS 
Capital flows have been attracting the attention of many since 1980’s. Main reason behind this interest 
has been the large number of advantages capital flows and integration with the financial markets 
would provide. In general, it was expected that for emerging markets which usually have a higher rate 
of return than industrialized countries, it would offer the possibility of cheaper trade and investment 
finance, it could facilitate channelling of world wide savings to more productive areas, finance current 
account deficits, increase growth and welfare of the world. It could also offer the opportunities for 
investors for a better portfolio diversification, allowing them to earn higher return for lower risk and 
could help to increase the efficiency of financial markets through competition and better market 
discipline, lesser volatility and hence improve their macro economic performances. 
However, as it become clearer to many after the East Asian crisis, there are also inherent  destabilizing 
factors in international markets such as asymmetric information and incomplete knowledge of 
emerging markets, which, because of the imbalance between lenders’ and borrowers’ position visa vis 
each other, even if lenders’ perception of borrowers’ position change marginally, may lead to wild 
fluctuations in borrowers’ liquidity which coupled with herding behavior may cause sudden reversals, 
disrupting all financial stability. 
Developing countries on the other hand, have higher inflation, usually suffer from high levels of 
exchange rate passthrough to inflation, if in addition there is high domestic and external indebtedness 
and currency mismatches, this usually forces the cental banks with the intention of reducing the effects 
of depreciation on inflation and output, to adopt an exchange rate that is relatively fixed, pegged or 
one that moves in a band.  
Given this picture, attracted by high interest rates and relatively fixed exchange rates in emerging 
countries, there was a surge in inflows between 1990-97, particularly to Latin America and Asia. 
Chile, Malaysia, Thailand and Mexico were the largest recipient of the inflows in the first half of the 
decade. After 1992, Eastern Europe also started to have a large share of the flows. Inflows of 1990’s 
were mostly in the form of nondebt creating instruments like portfolio investments and FDI, different 
than the bank lending type of the 1980’s. The short term nature of these flows created controversy 
among economists as to the source of volatility of the type of inflows. Claessens, Dooley and Warner 
(1995) argued that statistically they could not prove that long term flows were less volatile or easier to 
predict than than short term ones. Montiel and Reinheart (1999) were arguing on the other hand, that 
the higher volatility observed in Latin America compared to Asia  should not be attributed to the short 
term nature of the inflows, but to poor track record of Latin American countries. It was the Asian crisis 
of 1987 which has settled this volatility issue, since the major cause of the crisis was found to be the 
short term maturity of the unhedged debt (Adams et al 1998).The main reason behind the crisis was 
the high interest rates in countries with pegged or fixed exchange rates, which made it cheaper for   4 
everybody to finance their operations through foreign currency, however neglecting to hedge their 
foreign currency exposures resulted in financial crisis and the collapse of the fixed exchange rate 
regimes. 
The volatility of these flows, the crisis in many countries (1992-93 ERM crisis, 1994-95 Tequila 
Crisis, 1997-98 East Asian financial crisis, 1998 Russian crisis, 1999 Brazilian crisis),  sudden reversal 
of the flows and collapses of  exchange rate regimes has shifted the attention from  free flow of capital 
and integration of capital markets to the role of international flows in triggering crisis and to pros and 
cons of capital restrictions. Johnston and Tamirisa (1998), argue that in addition to balance of 
payments and macroeconomic management, institutional and prudential factors are important  in 
explaining  the recourse to controls. Controls can be in the form of  price based, quantity based and 
regulatory. Price based measures are usually in the form of tax like entry tax which aim at changing 
the return of the assets while quantity based controls aim at limiting the entry of foreign funds, or limit 
the external asset liability positions of domestic banks and financial institutions. Among the type of 
controls that attract the attention of many, one is the most famous, due to perhaps to the fame of its 
originator James Tobin. Tobin saw that international markets are inherently unstable due to 
speculative behavior and the exchange rate volatility. He came up in 1972 with the idea of a small 
uniform tax, the “Tobin Tax”(1978) applied to worldwide financial tansactions which would deter 
speculation and hence reduce foreign exchange volatility and improve macroeconomic performance. 
What’s more, it would raise a lot of revenue which could be used to support development efforts. 
II. TOBIN TAX 
The proponents of the Tobin Tax argue such a tax put on international financial transactions will 
discourage speculation by making currency trading more costly and the decreased volume of 
speculative inflows will lead to greater exchange rate stability. Also, the tax will stop the moral hazard 
problems created by government gurantees given to prevent the banks from going bankcrupt, by 
making speculation costly which will stop banks from taking excessive risks, since currency 
speculation in the form of for example unhedged foreign transaction is a way to exploit government 
guarantees.  
It is also argued that, since foreign exchange markets are characterized with multiple equilibria, in that  
certain fiscal and monetary policy mix can support more than one exchange rate value, for the players, 
it  may be very easy to switch from one to the other with just a little trigger and the Tobin tax would 
stop that.  
Another argument for the tax is that the Tobin Tax would decrease the burden on the policy makers in 
fixed exchange rate countries from making unpleasant policy choices such as conducting 
contractionary monetary policy when faced with outflows by either depreciating the currency or 
raising the interest rates, both of which will be detrimental to economy.   5 
The problem with the Tobin Tax is that, such a tax on purchases and sales of foreign exchange has to 
be universal and uniform, otherwise if it is imposed by one country only, it will be easily avoided by 
moving the foreign exchange market to offshore markets (Eichengreen,Tobin and Wyplosz(1994)). 
The big question of course is who will be entitled to the tax revenues and who will enforce the rules. 
Tobin had suggested IMF and World Bank for this role, assuming that everybody will be a member, I 
guess. There is also the additional problem of administrative cost of applying such a tax unifomly, 
which has to be deducted from this revenue. 
Spahn (1996), argues that as a pure transaction tax, Tobin Tax would not be effective, it would not 
stop speculation, but create liquidity problems and would impair the operations of the international 
financial markets. He cites four main reasons problems that will render the tax ineffective. 
The main problem is related to the base of the tax: for the tax to work, it has to apply to all 
transactions with no exception, however, this would punish market makers and financial institutions 
like central banks, which may not engage in speculative noise trading but is engaged in stabilizing 
liquidity providing trading. 
The second problem is related to identifying the taxable transactions, since if you put the tax on spot 
transactions, they could avoid it through financial derivatives, or forward transactions, so it has to be 
comprehensive. 
The third reason is that a small amount of tax like 1% will not deter speculation, if they expect larger 
than a 1% devaluation. If however it is high enough to deter speculation, then, it will  seriously 
jeopardize financial intermediation. 
The final problem is related to distribution of the revenue that the Tobin Tax would generate. Revenue 
will depend on the base, the rate and the type of transactions the tax will be imposed. 
If the turnover rate in foreign exchange markets is $1.23 trillion a day (in 1996),  a 1% tax would bring 
$13 billion a day, through strict mathematical calculation, disregarding the possible shrinkage of the 
size of the markets due to the imposition of the tax. Spahn argues that even if markets shrink by 99%, 
the revenue will be still sizable with $32 billion annually. However, seeing the unfeasibility of the 
imposition of such a tax, he suggests a version of it which will be effective but will not harm the 
workings of the markets. His idea of two tier Tobin Tax, consists of a minimal rate transaction tax on 
international financial transactions that would not create distortions in the market, and an additional 
surcharge tax, that would automatically start  functioning when there is a speculative attack. This way, 
tax would be high enough to deter speculation since surcharge tax would be like a circuit braker. Of 
course for this to work, it has to be uniformally applied like Tobin Tax. 
Since Tobin tax in its original fromulation was not applied anywhere due to its impracticality, it will 
remain as a intellectual exercise. However, there are variations of the Tobin Tax idea like   6 
unremunerated reserve requirements which are used by Chile, Columbia and Brazil to deter capital 
inflows. The next section will discuss  more practical version of the Tobin Tax, unremunerated 
reserve requirements within the context of successful Chilean type of inflow controls. 
III. CHILEAN INFLOW CONTROLS 
Chilean  controls on capital inflows attracted considerable attention by both policy makers and 
economists. Among the reasons, the fact that Chile managed to reduce inflation  from 30% a year  in 
1990 to 9%  in 1994, then to 4.5% in 1998 during the control period and also that it was relatively 
unaffected by the turbulence experienced by emerging markets in the 1990’s are the major ones. In 
fact, between 1994-1998, when major crisis ocurred throughout the world, Chile grew on average 
6.9% a year. Some like Ito and Portes(1998) support the capital controls because they were market 
oriented price based type of controls in the form of unremunerated reserve requirements(URR). Even 
Stiglitz(1999) argued that emerging countries should adopt a similar system like the one in Chile. 
Although, there are opposing views as to the success of restrictions imposed in 1991, the tight 
monetary policy Chile was able to follow with the help of URR though high interest rates and the 
accompanying expenditure reduction policy after 1990’s, were effective in reducing inflation. 
The two inflow restriction episode of 1981-82 and the 1991-96 in Chile were the same as far as the 
type of restriction imposed, however, the first one ended up with 90% devaluation of the peso and a 
crisis with government bailing out  large number of banks, while the second one is referred as the 
success story, by many. The difference between the two was due to the banking sector regulation and 
the fiscal discipline that accompanied the second. The poor banking sector regulation could not 
prevent the speculative activities of the banks in the 1980’s. The banking sector reform and  the new 
banking law which was first enacted in 1986 and amended in 1989,  put strict guideliness regarding 
banks’ exposure as well as the type of activities they would engage. In addition, to increase the 
transparency of capital markets in 1993, securities law passed. It took roughly 10 years for Chile to 
improve its banking sector’s soundness with adequate prudential supervision and regulation. The 
regulations also increased the depth of secondary markets and helped to decrease non-performing 
loans and paved the way for the success of the inflow control together with the sterilization policy 
mix.  
Chilean reasons for imposing restrictions in 1991 on inflows was related to both their growing concern 
in reducing inflation and also in  maintaining export competitiveness i.e their concern regarding  the 
overvaluation of the peso due to massive inflows. The restrictions helped them to lower inflation by 
keeping a wedge between domestic and international interest rates. Chile was relying on high interest 
rates since the 1980’s to reduce inflation. In fact, it was using interest rate targeting together with fixed 
exchange rate to this end. However, with the massive inflows, it was no longer possible to continue 
with this policy without restricting the inflows, by making it more costly through URR.   7 
Over the years Chilean Cental Bank changed the relative weights it attached to its goals. During 1982-
83, primary aim was to strengthen export competitiveness, to pay the huge short term debt and to keep 
sustainable current account deficit. So low inflation objective was secondary to the real exchange rate 
objective in the 1980’s (Cabrera and Lagos 2000). When capital started to flow back in the 1990’s, 
relative importance of the current account deficit ad real exchange rate declined somewhat and 
inflation control took precedence, yet, they were still in the background with sterilized intervention 
and control on capital inflows to  aid them. Chilean exchange rate policy was one with crawling band 
whose central parity was adjusted to the inflation differential of the past month, keeping real exchange 
rate deviation from the PPP to minimum with interventions and widening of the band when necessary. 
As authorities often claimed, they were not using the exchange rate band as a stabilization tool to 
decrease inflation but to keep the exchange rate consistent with medium to long term  sustainable 
current account deficit. In addition to the flexible use of the PPP adjusted band, they also used 
sterilized interventions and raised their reserve level to $18 billion before the Asian crisis from $3 
billion in 1990 (Morande, 2001). Another complementary tool to the exchange rate regime was the 
imposition of  selective capital controls in the face of large short term inflows in 1991, first on all 
foreign borrowing then on short term portfolio inflows. Edwards (1999) argue that the aim was to 
reduce the volume of inflows, to increase their maturity and also to prevent exchange rate appreciation 
resulting from the inflows as well as to pursue an independent monetary policy by maintaining high 
interest differential. Reserve requirements were to work like a tax on inflows, they were flexible and 
changed with the amount of inflows, originally it was 20% but later in 1992, it was raised  to 30% with 
the surge in inflows and  then in 1998, it was reduced first to 10% then to 0% with the  decreased 
inflows. While in 1991, reserve requirements were applied to foreign borrowing and portfolio inflows, 
in 1992, coverage was extended to trade credits as well as loans to foreign direct investment, and in 
1995, further widened by including the Chilean stocks traded in the New York Stock Exchange. Also 
minimum duration period was required for direct and portfolio investment from abroad. In addition, 
banks were obliged to report capital transactions. These policies were further supported by   
liberalization of capital outflows, increasing the width of crawling exchange rate band and 
stregthening the fiscal policy, shifting from deficit to surplus (Arioshi et al, 2000). However controls 
did not decrease the inflows, in fact, capital inflows that were 7.3% of GDP in 1990-95 period and 
rose to 11.3% in 1996-1997 period, but they were effective in shifting the inflows from portfolio to 
FDI and longer term. Total net FDI in 1990-1998 period was $25 billion, on an annual basis it was  
4% of GNP on average. The short term capital  which was 90% of  total capital inflows in 1990 
decreased to 2.8% in 1997 as a result of controls (Edwards, 1999). As for the success of the  controls 
in other intended areas, critics agree that it was not succesful since real exchange rate appreciated  on 
average 4% a year between 1991 and mid 1997  or 28% between 1991 –1998. What would the 
appreciation be had there been no control is difficult to answer. Also interest differential rose in the 
control period indicating that  the monetary autonomy goal was achieved but that may be perhaps   8 
more due to sterilization rather than controls (Nadal-De Simone and Sorsa,1999). So how much of it 
was due to success of reserve requirement policy is hard to say. The opponents argue that capital 
inflow controls were costly in terms of raising interest rates from where it would be without controls 
and also in segmenting the market between  big firms who could borrow from abroad and the smaller 
firms who were not able to do so which contributed to the slow growth. Pontes (1999) argue that 
capital controls affected the composition of the inflows only after 1995 when controls were 
intensified, basing her arguments on the work of Valdes-Prieto and Soto (1997). They argue that only 
with the tightening of controls, when the implicit tax due to reserve requirement increased from 3.6% 
to 6.7%  together with the change in Central Bank regulation requiring investors to hold their reserves 
in US dollars, restrictions were effective in limiting short term borrowing in 1995-96 period. This is in 
fact the general problem facing capital controls, because of evasions they need to be modified or 
strenghtened continously and their coverage has to be increased and exemptions have to be reduced to 
the minimum for them to be effective. Critics also argue that, there are discrepancies in the capital 
flow data. Nada-Del Simone and Sorsa(1999) argue that according to World Bank data,  short term 
debt increased in 1990s despite the controls, while offical data was showing decline for that period. 
This could be due to the evasions that the offical data did not capture but was captured by other 
statistics because the source was different, namely the creditor. Edwards(1999) notes that BIS data 
also indicates significant reduction of short term debt but only after the tightening of controls in 1995. 
The only thing that everybody agreed however was that the share of short term flows to total capital 
inflow declined  from 72.7% in 1991 to 2.8% in 1997 (Edwards, 1999). It  should be kept in mind 
though, that the success of  shifting the composition of inflows from short term to medium and longer 
term was not achieved only by restricting capital inflows through reserve requirement tool. They were 
accompanied with acompanying right mix of policies, always keeping budget surpluses and well 
designed prudential regulations such as prohibiting banks from lending in foreign exchange(except for 
trade credits), limiting their open foreign exchange positions  and also limiting their maturity   
mismatches (Eyzaguirre and Lefort, 1998). 
Actual impact of Chilean capital controls will remain the subject of controversy and discussions, with 
different analysts approaching the subject from different perspectives.  However, one should point out 
that during the URR control period 1991–1997, the Chilean economy grew at a respectable average 
8.5% a year and inflation declined from almost 30% a year to 4.5% a year. Current account  deficit, 
after declining to 2.1% of GDP only worsened with the major financial crisis and averaged 5.3% of 
GDP in 1996-1998 period (Marshall, 2000). International reserves were maintained above 20% of 
GDP and whereas the share of total FX debt remained at about 50% of GDP, the share of destabilizing 
short term debt was reduced from 14% to less than 6% of GDP. 
Chilean economy remained resilient in the aftermath of both Mexican crisis of 1994 and Asian crisis 
of 1997. It was during the Russian crisis that output growth declined to 3.8% and during the Brazilian   9 
crisis of 1999, they experienced a mild recession. In 1998, with the terms of trade shock, widening of 
current account deficit and slowdown of inflows, they tightened monetary policy to prevent large scale 
depreciations and and employed a countercylical fiscal policy with three fiscal cut backs on 
expenditures. However with the Brazilian crisis of 1999 and the serious drought due to La Nina, as 
output declined further and unemployment increased, they gave up the tight policies and switched to 
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. These policies with the favorable external environment, 
helped the economic recovery in late 1999, with budget deficit 1% of GNP, current account deficit 
decreasing to almost zero and inflation decreasing to 2.3% reflecting weak demand in 1999. Also in 
1999, they gave up the crawling band exchange rate policy and adopted clean floating (Morande 2001) 
which is more in line with inflation targeting regime eliminating the possible conflict with the the 
exchange rate. By 2000, mild recession experienced in 1999 was over, economy was expected to grow 
6% with fiscal deficit reversing itself in 2000 and unemployment recovering due to fiscal measures 
employed in 1999 (Aninat, 2000). 
In evaluating the Chilean success story of the second round of restrictions on capital flows, controls 
should be perceived only as one of the tools designed to enhance and to a degree safeguard the impacts 
of other key policies such as reform and restructuring of banking system through effective regulation 
and supervision, fiscal policy of budget surpluses and reduction of public debt, which eased the “high” 
interest rate anti-inflation policy and exchange rate regime of crawling peg with band in managing the 
current account deficits at acceptable levels. Controls, by reducing the short term inflows probably 
reduced the risks to Chilean economy from destabilizing sudden reversals, since they did not 
experience any crisis in the 1990’s unlike other Latin American countries. 
So the success of controls was predicated on “rightness” of other, key economic policies. And as 
Chilean experience with URR controls in the1978-1982 episode shows, if underlying policies are 
wrong, controls are not going to achieve the intended results at best.  
IV. MALAYSIAN  CONTROLS ON OUTFLOWS 
Malaysia is another success story cited in the capital control literature, however this one is on  outflow 
controls rather than on inflows. The World Bank, in its 1993 study has referred to East Asian 
Economies including Malaysia as the “East Asian Miracle”  due to the fast growth rate of the region. 
Malaysian Economist Jomo (2001) argues that rapid economic growth during the period prior to 1997 
was due to FDI which was way above average especially in the export oriented manufacturing sector. 
Some like Vines and Corbett (1999) argue that it was the insufficient institutional development, a 
natural outcome of the fast financial liberalization which paved the way for the miracle but also caused 
the vulnerability, that led to the crisis. To understand the mechanisms which led to the crisis and the 
role of controls as to what worked and why it worked, it may be a good idea to examine the Malaysian 
pre-crisis conditions more closely.   10 
In the early 1990s, between 1990-93, high and sustained growth with low inflation and high interest 
rate premium (Rajan,1999) led to massive long and short term inflows to Malaysia which was about 
15% of GDP. The 12% real exchange rate appreciation caused by the inflows (Fane, 2000), forced 
Malaysian authorities to put temporary restrictions on speculative inflows in 1994, in the form of ban 
of selling of securities by residents to nonresidents, prohibition of all swap transactions not related to 
trade, requirement of depositing all nonresident  foreign banks at the central bank and putting ceilings 
on the amount of foreign liabilities of the banks. The controls and the rise of dollar interest rates 
resulted in decline of capital inflows in the second half of 1994, as well as decline of interbank interest 
rates. In August, restrictions on selling securities to nonresidents and in December 1994, restrictions 
regarding residents borrowing in foreign currency and nonresidents borrowing has been lifted. The 
sharp decrease in interest differential as well as the controls had decreased inflows from 17% of GDP 
in 1993 to 1.5% in 1994 (Rajan,1999). During the 5 years prior to 1997 East Asian crisis, Malaysian 
macroeconomic conditions were still in good shape with 8.7% average growth, low inflation of 3.8% 
on average and fiscal surplus of around 2%. In 1996, reserves to external debt ratio was 70%, while 
short term debt to total debt was quite low with 28% especially when one compares it to that of Korea 
with 58%. Banking sector reforms carried out in the late 1980’s had strengthened the financial sector 
and hence, in 1996, the risk weighted capital asset ratio with 12% was far above Basel standards, non 
peforming loans were only 3.6% of total loans and ratio of reserve provisions to  non performing loans 
were almost 100%. The current account deficit remained relatively high with 5% of GDP, but given 
the high level of FX reserves which was twice the short term debt,  healthy banking system and very 
high rate of  domestic savings with 40% of GDP, this was not considered to be a problem. The main 
problem however was the reliance on short term inflows for the financing of persistent current account 
deficit. There was also the problem of  appreciation of Yen which, for the East Asian countries who 
had pegged their currencies to dollar, meant  loss of competitiveness starting from 1995 onwards. As 
the economy boomed, banks started  to lend heavily in speculative areas such as in construction, real 
estate and in stocks and with the decline in asset prices at the onset of the crisis, these loans have 
turned into nonperforming loans. In fact, The Central Bank, to control this credit expansion, cut bank 
lending from 30% to 25% in 1997 and to 15% in 1998. Jomo(2001) argues that Malaysia was the least 
vulnerable country in the region due to its precrisis restrictions on foreign borrowing as well as stricter 
banking regulations, but it was more vulnerable than the others from the persective of capital markets. 
The rapid growth, liberalized trade and positive prospects for the country have created an offshore 
ringgit market  in Hong Kong and Singapore. Bank of Malaysia did not approve of offshore deposits 
but did not restrict the growth of the offshore market other than banning its own offshore market from 
accepting ringgit deposits and restricting lending. This set up with restriction in one market (direct 
lending in offshore market) and no restricition in the other (in indirect lending in swap and forward 
markets) market had worked without creating large interest differential between onshore and offshore   11 
market till 1997 (Fane, 2000). However, the imposition of restrictions in August 1997 on indirect 
lending in swap and forward markets had caused interest rates in offshore ringgit market to rise above 
that of onshore market 10 to 30%. The attractiveness of high interest rates in offshore markets 
disrupted the balance between these two markets and created motives for under invoicing of exports, 
overinvoicing of imports and smuggling of currency. 
Malaysia was a small open economy with 23 million people, specializing in export of raw materials 
such as rubber, thin and oil and computer chips, hence dependent on international markets. Also 
Malaysia and Thailand had similar export structures, even though Thailand is twice as big as 
Malaysia. In 1997, when Thai baht was suddenly devalued, it created expectations of devaluation of 
ringgit as well, since Malaysia was also thought to lose her competitiveness. To respond to the 
mounting pressures on currency as well as to the collapse of the stock market, Malaysia initially 
increased interest rates and continued with tight fiscal policy i.e followed IMF style policies with 
floating exchange rates and relatively liberal capital account (other than restricting residents to 
nonresident lending in ringgit) without actually resorting to IMF emergency assistance. However, 6% 
GDP decline in the first half of 1998, together with rising unemployment and continuing capital 
outflow, inspite of 12% current account surplus to finance the outflow, caused them to turn away 
drastically from IMF style policies and replace them with looser monetary and expansionary fiscal 
policies like the other countries hit by the contagion in the region, to counter the recession. The fiscal 
deficit forecast which was 3.6% in the fiscal 1998, was allowed to rise to 6.1% in 1999. In addition, 
the ringgit which had depreciated by 80% under the managed float during the 7 months prior to 
January 1998, due to comprehensive restructuring of the financial and corporate sector by the 
government, started appreciating in September 1998 and that’s when they decided to peg the currency 
and also impose exchange controls, since looser monetary and fiscal policies could not have isolated 
the economy from speculators without the controls. The controls were mainly restrictions on outflows 
to prevent capital exports by nonresidents and to stop speculation against ringgit (Fane, 2000). The 
partial freeze of external accounts aimed at trapping the foreign potfolio investment that was already in 
the country and to destroy the offshore ringgit deposit markets. Withdrawals from external accounts 
were possible only if ringgit assets were bought in return  i.e could credit  the proceeds to their 
onshore accounts but could not remit  them to their offshore accounts. The freeze was further 
reinforced by prohibiting the travellers to take more than 1000 ringgit notes in or out of the country 
and for exporters to accept ringgit. 
Controls were successful as far as the immediate aim of closing the offshore market is concerned. 
Authorites were careful in coordinating the easing of monetary policy with the imposition of controls. 
Once the offshore market was wiped out, they lowered the interbank interest rates. These rates which 
were hiked to 11% in 1998 with the initial monetary tightening, came down gradually to 3.15% by the 
end of 1999. In line with the decrease in interbank rates, credit rates also came down, since banks were   12 
required to bring the base lending rate margin over the interbank rate  from 4 to 2.5 percentage points. 
Inflation which was 5.6% in August 1998, came down to 2.5% by the end of 1999. The stock market 
index which was 262 at the time of controls, came up to 600 and above. International reserves which 
were covering 4.3 months of imports, increased  to 5.7 months of imports by the end of 1998. 
Since the controls were imposed when bulk of the capital had already left and the other countries hit 
by the crisis in the region was already in the recovery mode, although that was not so obvious at the 
time when Malaysia imposed controls, it is difficult to attribute the Malaysian success just to the 
controls. After all, Korea which did not control its capital account, had started recovery earlier than 
Malaysia and achieved a 10% remarkable growth. Favorable external environment such as lower 
interest rates were also helpful in the recovery. So if  it was contagion responsible for the spread of the 
crisis to Malaysia, maybe it was the same contagion at least partially responsible for the Malaysian 
recovery, even though the literature discusses contagion only for the spread of crisis but never for the 
recovery. One thing is clear, however and that is the authorities did use the time provided by the 
controls effectively in reducing the interest rates, in recapitalizing the banks, cleaning the 
nonperforming loans i.e did all the structural reforms necessary for longer term growth without 
external IMF credit. It should be also noted that Malaysia was economically much more sound than 
other countries in the region which probably helped them in their recovery without the IMF policies. 
As for the costs of the controls, there has been no exact calculation, no attempt to measure the 
compliance and the administrative costs. Bank of Malaysia  tried very hard to reduce the cost of 
control in terms of  minimizing any misunderstanding by explaining the controls, preannouncing the 
end of controls and explaining the graduated exit taxes. However, controls as always create 
uncertainty for foreign investors. In case of Malaysia, rating agencies downgraded Malaysian 
sovereign and credit risk right after the imposition of controls which skyrocketed the spread on 
Malaysian sovereign debt intruments to 1000 basis points from 50 points prior to the crisis. With the 
Russian debt default of August 1998, Malaysian spreads jumped about 300 basis points, more than 
that of Thailand, Korea and Philippiness. Its decline was also 2 months behind that of the other 
countries(Hood 2001). Would it be less costly, had they resort to IMF financial assistance and  IMF 
policies instead? This is difficult to say ex-ante, but had they done that, then there would be no case of 
successful outflow control in the literature to cite. 
V. KOREA’s INCOMPLETE LIBERALIZATION 
Korea is probably the best answer to those who think controls can prevent financial crisis, since the 
exchange rate and capital controls prevalent in Korea in 1997, prevented neither the speculative attack 
on the currency that was not fully convertible at that time, nor the crisis. In fact, Korean economy, 
although looked macroeconomically sound before the crisis, was  one of the most hard hit ones by it. 
In 1998, Korean economy shrank by 6.7% as a result of the crisis, but resumed growth with 10.7% in a   13 
year in 1999. To see what went wrong, it might be beneficial to review the Korean liberalization 
experience. 
In Korea, policy stance toward capital account  liberalizations was slow, passive and sort of residual to 
current account developments. In the first half of 1980’s, capital inflows and borrowing by domestic 
banks were encouraged to finance the deficit of current account while in the second half of 1980’s 
when current account started to have a surplus, direct controls on capital account were imposed. Korea 
started liberalization in 1992 when stock market was open to foreign investments, but with 10% 
ceiling on foreign ownership of listed firms. This was relaxed to 12% in 1994 and 15% in 1995. 
Commercial borrowing by domestic firms abroad was permitted in 1995, but still required government 
approval, as did the issuance of foreign currency denominated bonds by domestic firms and long term 
capital inflows channeled through banks. The rationale behind the slow liberalization policy was the 
assumption that faster liberalization would trigger large capital inflows which would lead to real 
exchange rate appreciation and the loss of international competitiveness, making it impossible to 
maintain monetary targeting simultaneously with pegged exchange rate. There were some exceptions 
to the controls which could be grouped into three: trade related short term financing, short term 
foreign currency borrowing by banks and overseas direct  investment by domestic firms. They were 
exempted because they were not considered to endanger stability of the financial markets. 
Gradual liberalization, investment led boom, steady growth over a number of years combined with 
upgrading of sovereign credit rating, even with controls still in place, caused a surge in capital inflows 
starting from 1994. The inflows due to the structure of controls were mostly in the form of debt 
instruments (portfolio) and short term foreign borrowing by banks which meant increasing external 
debt for Korea; short term increasing faster than overall debt. The surge in inflows in 1994-95 caused 
appreciation of the Won which led to sterilized intervention. The terms of trade shock and exchange 
rate misalignment between 1996-97 that was thought to be temporary and hence not corrected 
immediately, led to a current account deficit of over $20 billion which was corrected only by the first 
half of 1997. 
In general at the onset of the crisis, macroeconomic indicators did not show any sign of weakness. 
Internal fundamentals such as GDP growth, fiscal position, CPI inflation and employment were 
indicating strength but some indicators like widening current account deficit and decline in stock 
prices were creating concern. The instability signals other than widening of the current account deficit 
to 5% of GDP and increase in short term foreign debt to 58% of total debt in 1996, showed more at the 
micro level. There were two main weakness related to financial sector: one was the undercapitalization 
of banks and non bank financial institutions and the second was the failure to manage external 
liquidity risk by banks. Even though, banks, including the 5 nonviable banks that were closed in June 
1988, seemed to fulfill BIS capital adequacy requirements, those ratios did not reflect the real health of 
the banks. Half of the foregin currency operations of the banking sector was handled by overseas   14 
transactions and since they were not reflected in monetary conditions, macro variables  looked all 
right. Had the short term external liabilities of overseas branches been taken into account, Bank of 
Korea’s foreign exchange reserves would  turn out to be not sufficient  against  a possible liquidity run 
by foreign creditors(Shin, 2001). These problems came into open in the second half of 1997, when 
capital flows were reversed as foreign investors reduce their exposure to Korea. Increasing financial 
difficulties, high interest rates coupled with loss of export competitiveness and  the decline in basic 
export  prices such as computer chips and autos started squeezing profits and led to corporate failures. 
Stock market plumpeted and the curency started fluctuating in  8-10% band and ended up with a 50% 
devaluation in 2 weeks. All these developments led to authorities to ask for IMF assistance and IMF 
approved the largest financial rescue package to date in December 1997 (Adelman and Nak, 1999). 
The worsening of financial climate, downgrading of Korean bonds, banks’ inability to renew maturing 
loans and  huge withdrawals coupled with the realization of the inadequacy of  foregin reserves to 
cover the due debt payments, led to debt restructuring negotiations  with commercial banks. G-7 
central banks used direct pressure on international banks to lengthen their credit lines and they agreed 
on resheduling  $24 billion of debt and replacing the bank loans with sovereign guaranteed bonds. In 
addition, $22 billion interbank claims were  converted into bonds of up to 3 year maturity with 225 to 
275 points above libor. As a result of these developments short term debt was reduced from $61 
billion to $41 billion in April 1998 (Ghosh et al, 2002). Had there been no private sector involvement 
in combination with official financing, output contraction and the current account adjustement in 
response to outflows would have been larger. Foreign assistance helped to replenish reserves and the 
tight monetary policy stabilized the currency, but also helped to transmit the crisis into real sector. 
These developments turned crisis into a depression and to solve the crisis, in December 1997, in 
addition to restructuring of short term debt, government also restructured the banking sector and the 
bankrupt large conglomerates (Chaebols) in phases, closed 5 unviable banks out of 21, recapitalized 
the others and imposed new rules and prudential supervision on banks together with the blanket 
deposit guarantees (Adelman and Nak,1999; Balino and Ubide,1999; Shin, 2001). 
Korean case also showed the importance of corporate governance since the increased liabilities of 
overseas branches of banks were due to the overseas investments of large Korean firms which were 
too big and stagnant to handle overseas investment. Together with the weak banking supervision 
system, lack of corporate governance for those “too big to fail” conglomerates, indicated the 
importance of institutional reforms as one of the most important prerequisites of the capital account 
liberalizations more so than the order of liberalization that was so criticized. US pressure to open up 
the Asian markets so that American products can access to expanding and new markets and Korea’s 
membership into OECD in1996 hastened Korea’s liberalization process, in fact helped the surge in 
inflows since it was perceived to be a riskless country. Critics argue that financial system was 
operating under different set of rules in Korea, such as lending based on connections and/or   15 
government instruction and therefore, it was not ready to handle such a fast deregulation with 
restrictions being lifted first on short term more volatile and speculative flows, rather than on the long 
term flows. Shin (2001) argues that had the long term flows were liberalized earlier than short term 
ones as criticized by many, Korea might have escaped the liquidity crisis, but would still suffer from 
lack of transparency in financial and corporate sectors, the weak banking supervision and inadequate 
corporate governance. 
The rationale behind these policies of slow liberalization was the assumption that faster liberalization 
would trigger large capital inflows which would lead to real exchange rate appreciation causing loss of 
international competitiveness, making it impossible to maintain simultaneously domestic monetary 
targeting and pegging the exchange rate to the US dollar. 
Capital flows were fully liberalized only in April 1999. But no additional capital controls were 
imposed as a response to crisis in 1997- 1998(Balino and Ubide,1999; Shin, 2001). That is, if 
restructuring of debt is not considered a type of outflow control in disguise! 
VI. BRAZIL’S REAL PLAN 
During the late 1980’s and early 1990’s Brazilian economy experienced high and increasing inflation, 
reaching almost 2700% in 1993. Various efforts to contain this inflation and to stabilize this higly 
indexed economy via price and wage controls, indexation, taxes, high interest rates and freezing bank 
deposits successively failed. In spite of the six different stabilization programs between 1986 and 1993 
(Dornbusch, 2000), inflation continued to accelerate and government financing needs continued to 
grow. 
The success came with a new reform program based on the idea of parallel currency  and structural 
reform called the “Real plan” which was implemented in 1994. The plan envisaged introduction of 
new currency called the Real. However before its introduction, as part of the deindexation  mechanism 
of the plan and  to break the feedback from wages to prices and vice versa, wages were linked to a new 
index which in turn was tied to US dollar. This system was designed to replace all indexation 
mechanism and unify them under one account and was implemented in March 1994. Later in July 
1994, the new currency, the Real was introduced and was tied to the new index as well. Hence both 
wages and the new currency were tied to US dollar rather than to past months’ price index, which was 
in Sachs’ words  “a clever way of breaking the self fulfillment in inflation without fiscal austerity 
measures”. In addition, the foreign debt was rescheduled and its structure and size changed with the 
aggreement of the lenders. These steps were instrumental in breaking inflationary expectations almost 
instantaneously and annual inflation declined from 2700% in 1994, to 27% in 1995 and to a single 
digit in 1998. Monthly inflation declined from 46% in June 1994 to just 1.5% in September 1994 
(Goldfajn, 2000). Even though the GNP growth declined in the process, the decline was gradual and 
not drastic, from 6% in 1994, to 3% in 1997.   16 
Nominal interest rates declined significantly as well, to about 50% in 1995 and to upper 20’s 
subsequently. This reduced the nominal fiscal deficit, even though the government borrowing 
requirements remained still high, with deficit at about 6% of GDP in 1996, increasing to almost 9% in 
1998 (Goldfajn, 2000). 
The success of the Real plan was enhanced by reforms in several additional areas. External trade 
relations were significantly liberalized. By 1994 most of quotas were abolished and average tariff was 
reduced to 14% compared to 51% in 1988. Also privatization process was so successful that between 
1995-1997, FDI had increased from 13% to 63% of capital account balance (Garcia and Valpassos, 
1998), moreover it was not reversed even during the Mexican crisis. 
Perhaps more importantly, it was the substantial reforms undertook by the banking sector much before 
the crisis, including strengthened supervision and regulation by the Central Bank, increased and 
enforced capital adequacy ratios and introduction of foreign competition, that was instrumental in 
strenghtening the economy. However, since inflation declined faster than nominal interest rates, the 
real interest rates remained high – between 16% and 25% in 1995-1998 period. This triggered very 
strong capital inflows from the onset of the real program in 1994 (Garcia and Valpassos,1998). Those 
inflows were, however, highly unstable and were reversed significantly between December 1994-
March 1995 due to the Mexican crisis. Subsequently, restriction on capital inflows were relaxed. 
Shortly after the introduction of Mexican rescue package however, capital started flowing back to 
Brazil. Meanwhile, to prevent the currency appreciation and growing current account deficit, the 
Central Bank changed its policy and in March 1995, instead of a pure float, they adopted a very 
narrow crawling band regime and also started intervening in the exchange market, buying the extra 
supply of dollars (Salgado et al, 2001) adjusting the band frequently with a certain built in 
depreciation rate. This regime lasted till January 1999. However high interest rates and the resulting 
increase in public sector debt which had reached to 44% of GDP in 1998 from 28.5% in 1994, 
continued to be a problem.  
There was the additional problem of excessive inflows during that time. Between the recovery from 
Mexican crisis and the beginning of East Asian crisis (1995-1997), the surge in inflows, necessitated 
sterilization which led to further increases in interest rates and high quasi fiscal costs. To alleviate the 
high interest cost of stabilization and to help to protect the exchange rate regime, Brazil resorted back 
to controls on short term capital inflows. In fact, controls with the purpose of reducing short term 
inflows in fixed income securities so as to prevent further debt increases had already started in 1993. 
Controls took many different forms such as restricting or banning investments in certain assets, putting 
or increasing tax rates on portfolio inflows or taking measures to increase the maturity of permissible 
investments
1. 
                                                 
1 Main elements of capital inflow controls  were a) reserve requirements on short term inflows (15% on ACG’s to be deposited at the central 
bank and 30% on contracts that takes over importers’ obligations, later raised to 60%);  b) “foreign  loans entrance” tax  (increased from 3%   17 
Also, regulations were changed in the direction of  preventing dollar liabilities of banks and increasing 
their dollar assets such as reducing banks’ selling positions by 50% of their networth while increasing 
buying positions from $2 to $10 million provided that the excess will deposited at the Central Bank 
(Garcia and Valpassos, 1998). After the introduction of the Real plan in July 1994, due to the 
appreciation of the real (then floating), further measures to increase banks’ buying position from $10 
to $50 million were taken. Additionally, in August 1994, outflow controls were further liberalized. 
They also aimed at increasing the demand for foreign exchange by increasing the amount that can be 
invested abroad without central bank authorization from $1 million to $5 million. The authorities 
while trying to change composition of inflows from volatile short term inflows towards longer term 
ones, they were also trying  to increase the quality of capital with the measures taken. 
The problem was that these controls had to be frequently monitored and adjusted due to developments 
in the world economy, especially in the aftermath of Mexican crisis in 1994 and Asian crisis in 1997. 
At the time of crisis, restrictions on inflows were eased or totally abandoned, once the effect of the 
crisis passed they were installed again, sometimes with a bigger strength. But, perhaps more 
importantly, there was a large degree of evasion, making the effectiveness of capital controls 
questionable (Cardoso and Goldfajn,1999; Arioshi et al., 2000). 
The key element in limiting the effectiveness of capital controls was the sophistication of Brazilian 
financial markets. Derivatives based on the unrestricted flows were always quickly developed to 
circumvent any adjustments in capital controls themselves. Therefore, controls were temporarily 
effective in reducing short term inflows, but not lasting.  
Whether more radical or more successful capital controls could prevent the crisis which eventually 
came in 1999 is questionable. Indeed, it was the capital inflows which contributed to both high 
domestic interest rates, inflation pressures and to currency real appreciation. However, given the 
collapse of domestic savings (Eustaquio Jose Reis, in John McHale, 2000) and the need to finance 
growing budget deficits, the foreign savings (i.e. the capital inflow) may be seen as the source of 
domestic investments and growth in 1994-1999 period.  
One advantage of the inflows was  the sharp increases in foreign reserves from $10 billion in 1991 to 
$74 billion in April 1998, which was almost 10% of GDP (Valpassos, 1998), enabling Brazil to 
continue with the exchange rate anchoring. However, the real appreciation persisted and by the end of 
1998 the Real  was estimated to be overvalued by 15 to 25% (Gruben and Welch, 2001) and the 
current account deficit had reached from -0.3% in 1994 to -4.5% in 1998. 
                                                                                                                                                       
to 7% on loans and from 5% to 9% on investments) and the minimum period for foreign loans( increased from 90 days to 540 days). In 1995 
entrance tax  was adjusted inversely to loan maturity (5% for 2 years or less,  4% for 3 years, 2% for 4years, 1% for 5 years  and no tax for 6 
yeas and more.  c) Derivatives markets in Brazil were forbidden to foreign investors.  Simultaneously, the previous restrictions on capital 
outflows were relaxed and eventually abolished. (Detail description of controls are in Garcia and Valpassos, 1998)   18 
Hence, the 1999 crisis was not a surprise. Given Brazil’s history of fiscal indulgence, domestic public 
debt  had risen to 36% of GDP  in 1998, from 30.2% in 1997, while external debt had reached  to 6.6% 
of GDP from 4.3% in 1997. With increasing budget and current account deficits and continuing 
exchange rate overvaluation on the domestic side and frequent financial turmoils in the emerging 
markets in 1990’s, the question was more and more not if, but when. 
With its high and sharply increasing interest rate policy Brazil had weathered both 1994 Mexican 
crisis and 1997 Asian crisis with its exchange regime intact. There were outflows in the last quarter of 
1997 due to Asian crisis, but inflows resumed again in the beginning of 1998 in such a magnitude that 
it more than offset the outflows. Austerity in 1997 had pushed Brazil into recession but the final blow 
came with the Russian crisis in 1998.  
When the Russian debt default hit shortly after East Asian crisis, the same policy of ratcheting interest 
rates and promising fiscal deficit cuts did not work anymore. In fact, it created an opposite effect 
causing massive capital outflows. First, because previous policies of hiking interest rates had already 
worsened the budget deficit causing it to reach 8% of GDP in 1998, virtually all of it being interest 
payments on short term government debt. In addition, Brazilian parliament was taking social security 
reforms not so seriously, it had rejected social security reform already four times, rendering the fiscal 
adjustment promises not credible. Additionally, declining output with increasing unemployment  had 
created too much social unrest. Hence, increasing interest rates in such a context, backfired and led to 
capital outflows of massive proportion ($30 billion) in 1998. Clearly, interest rate policy and the 
implied exchange rate regime was not sustainable. Devaluation became almost inevitable and markets 
were expecting it from September 1998 onwards. In fact, private sector had already hedged its foreign 
exchange liabilities, leaving the burden of adjustment to public sector. 
When IMF rescue package of $41 billion finally arrived in December 1998, FX reserves had already 
declined by $35 billion and hence financial aid conditioned on fiscal reform provided very short 
breathing space. Additionally, domestic political difficulties due to refusal of a province to pay its debt 
to federal government fuelled fears of debt default, triggering capital outflow again – about $1 billion 
a week in the beginning of January 1999. Realizing that 7% depreciation built into the system was not 
enough to offset the inflation differential, exchange rate band was increased to 9%. However, with the 
increased current account deficit and the flight of institutional investors, 2 days after the decision to 
increase depreciation rate, exchange rate regime became untenable and the Real was floated in mid 
January 1999, losing about 36% of its value by March 1999. 
In the aftermath of crisis, they were able to reach some fiscal adjustment, which, together with a lower 
interest rates, reduced the budget deficits and hence government borrowing needs which further 
reduced interest rate and hence short term, potentially destabilizing capital inflows. A revised 
agreement was reached with IMF in March 1999. This agreement included the adoption of inflation   19 
targeting and bailing in of foreign creditors in stabilizing foreign debt, which stemmed capital outflow 
(Ghosh, 2002). 
The essence of this “bailing in” was convincing international banks to keep their credit lines open, 
willingly. For that, first Brazil’s ability to finance balance of payments during the second quarter of 
1999 was projected, assuming low rollover rates for most payments to foreign creditors, the financing 
gap, which was hoped to be covered by loans from international institutions, was reached. This 
financing plan was presented to foreign commercial banks (creditors) together with request for support 
in the form of a collective rollover of trade and inter-bank credit lines. They were very careful in 
dealing with commercial banks so as not to give them the impression that they were coerced into 
dealing with Brazil in keeping their credit lines open, because this could recreate debt default 
expectations of the past. In Fraga’s words, “To encourage and convince commercial banks of the 
credibility of the new plan, we provided information to each group not only about its own exposure to 
Brazil but also about the exposures of every other region. This policy of using information disclosure 
as a coordination device restored the confidence”. 
This approach worked. Capital outflow was contained. By August 1999 the voluntary “bail in” 
agreement was no longer necessary (Fraga, 2000). As a consequence, the Real actually appreciated by 
about 12% between March and December 1999 (Gruben and Welch, 2001).  
Brazil recovered from the 1999 crisis relatively fast. The long feared devaluation inflation spiral did 
not take place. The reasons for this low inflation pass through were depressed demand (-0.12% GDP 
growth) and very low inflation (1.66%) at the end of 1998 (Goldfajn and Verlang, 2000). 
There were no bankcruptcies as a result of devaluation and balance sheet effects were low. By the time 
domestic growth resumed, the new policies of inflation targeting and monetary restraint were in place, 
together with a prudent fiscal stance. 
However, in discussing Brazilian recovery after 1999 crisis, one has to stress the importance of the 
health and stability of banking system (Gruben and Welch, 2001). In contrast to Thailand and Korea in 
1997 and Turkey in 2001, the Brazilian exchange crisis was not accompanied by banking crisis. The 
credit for that belongs to policies of modernization, opening up to international competition and 
banking sector reform much before the financial crisis. In 1996, they issued new regulations that will 
enable to rescue the public banks, due to worsening of their loan portfolios, by either privatizing, 
liquidating or transferring them to public agencies. In addition to increase the efficiency of small 
financial institutions through competition, they allowed foreign banks to control them. As the nature of 
the crisis in East Asia become more apparent, they took further measures to strengthen their banking 
system, such as raising the risk based minimum capital requirement from 8% to 10% in June 1997, 
then raising it again to 11% after the Korean crisis in November. In addition in 1997, laws to enhance 
the powers of Central Bank that will enable it to enforce change of management, closures or mergers   20 
for banks in liquidity distress were passed. Later in 1998, Central Bank was given further power in 
compelling the banks to implement financial controls (Gruben and Welch, 2001). 
In addition to the measures taken before the crisis, given the fact that the crisis was long predicted, 
banks had enough time to hedge their FX exposure, mostly by derivatives based on government FX 
reserves (Gruben and Welch, 2001) which has increased cost of the crisis to Brazilian Treasury by 
10%.  But, on the other side, the healthy and functioning banking system was instrumental in post-
crisis recovery. 
Hence to solve the crisis, Brazil used tight fiscal policy, inflation targeting and external financial 
assistance. As far as the role of the capital controls is concerned, jury is still out. It is clear that 
controls did not prevent the buildup of FX liabilities and hence crisis when capital flows were reversed 
in later part of 1999. However, one may argue that by temporarily shifting the composition of capital 
inflows away from volatile short term portfolio kind (Garcia and Valpassos,1998), controls reduced 
the risk of crisis in both 1995 and 1997. Time therefore gained was invaluable, because it enabled 
Brazil and its Central Bank to institute necessary banking reforms and hence to facilitate the quick 
recovery in post-1999 crisis period. 
VII. TURKEY’S BANKING AND LIQUIDITY CRISIS DURING THE IMF 
PROGRAM 
Turkey is the last counry examined in this paper. Main reason for including Turkey  is to point out to 
the fact that, even though its stabilization and disinflation program with controlled exchange rate 
devaluations came only 11 months after the Brazilian crisis, neither the authorities nor the IMF closely 
examined the East Asian crisis and took the precautionary measures like Brazilians did to strenghten 
their banking system which mitigated the effect of the crisis on them in 1999. Not only that, but, when 
one considers the recent debate about decreasing interest rates by force, without even looking at the 
facts which makes the interest rates high in the first place, it is sadly obvious that Turkey did not learn 
her lesson from her own crisis in 1994!  
In Turkey, external financial liberalization had started in 1984 and was further widened in 1989-90 
with the removal of all restrictions on capital movements and on borrowing by residents in 
international markets and accepting the Article VIII of IMF Articles of Agreement and hence the 
convertibility of the currency. Turkey had completed its trade and financial market liberalization much 
before 1989, however, was still suffering from high public sector deficits and high interest rates when 
Decree no 32 which lifted major restrictions on capital movements was issued in 1989. 
The setting up of an institutions and the regulatory system is very important for the success of 
liberalization. With this in mind, in the area of banking sector reforms, Turkey had  adopted  the New 
Banks Act in 1985 to strenghten the structural weaknesses of its banking system. With this act, 
standard accounting practices were introduced, provisions for minimum capital base for banks were   21 
made and capital adequacy ratios in line with BIS were established, banks were required to report 
nonperforming loans and have provisions for loan defaults and the governments were authorized to 
change the management of troubled banks, however, the prerequisites for taking over the troubled 
banks made it extremely hard for governments to take over in practice, a very important issue to be 
taken up later with the changes made in the law in 1993 and 1994. At any rate, Turkey had some 
experience with banking supervision since 1985, before fully liberalizing capital account in 1990 
(Ersel 2000). 
So even though this was a drastic step in modernizing the banking sector, there were still some 
weaknesses, the main one being the exceptional treatment of state banks both in terms of assigning 
certain nonbank activities to them, thereby creating duty losses which was to be financed by central 
government’s budget. In fact, later in 2001 Treasury issued government securities amounting to TL 23 
quadrillion to compensate their duty losses). To alleviate the problem imposed on the state banks, they 
were not so strictly regulated which created additional financial distortions in the market against 
private banks. Hence the interference by government in banks portfolio allocation was one of the main 
problems, pretty similar to the ones Koreans had with chaebolds before the Asian crisis. 
The lifting of the restrictions in the presence of high public sector deficit and high interest rates 
resulted in massive increase in short term capital inflow to the banking sector. As a natural result of 
liberalizing under those circumstances, domestic currency appreciated in spite of Central Bank’s 
purchase of dollars in the foreign exchange market and current account deficit increased. One 
advantage of the capital account liberalization in 1989-90 was that it changed the composition of 
PSBR financing towards domestic public borrowing from foreign borrowing, while, the reverse was 
true for the private sector. The short term nature of the high yielding public debt instruments together 
with the appreciation of the currency motivated them to borrow in foreign currency and lend in 
domestic market. Hence, total removal of capital account restrictions resulted in decreased public 
foreign borrowing to be replaced by private foreign borrowing (Altinkemer and Ekinci ,1992). 
With the capital account liberalization, banks ability to get short term freign credits helped to postpone 
the fiscal adjustments, increasing the budget deficit and the domestic debt stock even further, while 
shortening its maturity, which created doubts as to the sustainability of budget deficits. These 
developments eventually culminated in the crisis of 1994 with 23.9% real depreciation of the Turkish 
Lira, inflation skyrocketing to 3 digits with 132.1% and interest rates increasing on average to 158.1% 
for the year. 
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TABLE 1 
SHORT TERM CAPITAL MOVEMENTS (Mio $) 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000  2001 2002 
Portfolio  190 1059 -149 -761 -140  -6132  209  -5230 -4611  -1284 
Assets  -563  35 -466  -1380 -710  -1622 -759 -593  -788  -2197 
Liabilities  753  1024 317 619 570  -4510 968  -4637  -3823 913 
Short Term FX Credits  3388  -6732 1247 776* 1310  482 2010 4869  -6869  -1458 
Banks  3782  -6601 801 769 724  63  2070  4741  -7052  -730 
Other  Sectors  -394  --131 446  7 586 419 -60 128  183  -728 
TOTAL  3578  -5673 1098  15 1170  -5650 2219 -369  -11480  -2742 
Source: Central Bank BOP 
* The decrease in short term fx credits was due to  Resource Utilization Fund. Banks to avoid the tax shifted the maturity of short term fx 
credits to slightly longer  than 1 year. 
At the end of 1993, before the crisis, Turkey was facing  an overheated economy (7.7 % growth), with 
an appreciated currency (8.9%), increased current account deficit (5% of GNP), little foreign exchange 
reserves (about 2,5 months of imports) and a rising and unsustainable PSBR (12%). These figures 
were accompanied by high inflation and high real interest rates  and a weak banking system with high 
foreign exchange exposure reaching  $4.6 billion. In addition, in mid January, Turkey’s rating was 
downgraded to a noninvestment grade which started the capital outflow and foreign exchange deposit 
withdrawals which in turn increased demand for foreign currency. Finally, government’s’ insistance 
on lowering the interest rates through cancelling of auctions and resorting to short term advances from 
the central bank disrupted the markets and expectations even further, chanelling the excess liquidity to 
foreign exchange market, brought about the crisis in 1994. On  January 1994, devaluation of 19%,  
although seems to be small in size, affected the banks with short positions significantly, and turmoil 
lasted till April 1994 stabilization program. Between January and first week of April 1994, Turkish 
Lira had depreciated more than 130% against US dollar, Cental Bank intervened in both foreign 
exchange market and TL market and lost  more than half of its reserves  to defend the currency  and 
was left with bare minimum $3 billion, also hiked the overnight interest rates to 700% and inflation 
rose to 103% from some 60% in 1993. Capital account  recorded  $6.9 billion net outflow compared to 
$4.7 billion of net inflow of 1993. Surprisingly, portfolio inflows were not hurt in 1994, on the 
contrary soared compared to 1993, but it was the short term foreign exchange credits(excluding trade 
credits) that suffered due to the crisis in 1994. With an IMF stand by aggreement and short term 
emergency solutions such as one-off tax, huge increase in public prices, increase in reserve and 
liquidity requirements, accepting triple digits in goverment securities’ interest rates in auctions, full 
deposit insurance coverage, emergency loans to insolvent banks and a medium term plan to decrease 
short term advances to the Treasury yet with no structural reforms neither in privatization nor in social   23 
securities, crisis was weathered away quite fast or postponed for a bigger one yet to come in 2000. 
After the settling of the crisis in 1995, capital flows resumed and in fact, between 1995-97 for 3 years 
in a row, Turkey experienced high average growth rate of around 8%. It also accumulated substantial 
amount of foreign reserves($17 billion) due to high interest rates and subsequent inflows. Altinkemer 
(2001) indicates that in the period following the full liberalization of capital account in 1990 till the 
crisis in 1994, only 29% of the inflows were used for reserve build up while the rest was chanelled to 
finance the current account deficit. Moreover consumption as a share of GDP increased by 6.3% in 
that period (1990-93) compared to the pre-inflow period of (1987-89), while investment declined. 
However in the period following the crisis between 1994-97, share of capital inflow that was used for 
reserve accumulation increased to 45% while the amount used to finance the current account deficit 
decreased to 55%. Hence, increased inflows as well as increasing surrender requirements as part of 
April 5 measures were effective in reserve build up. 
When East Asian crisis hit in 1997, Turkey was still struggling with high inflation, high real interest 
rates and budget deficits. Despite these shortcomings, it weathered the Asian crisis fairly well, but was 
more adversely affected by the Russian crisis in August 1998. As a result of the crisis, stock market 
plumpeted, Central Bank reserves declined by $5.2 billion, portfolio outflow of $6.1 billion (Table I) 
resulted in liquidity squeeze and a rise in interest rates which in turn worsened the budget and GNP 
declined after 3 years of high growth. In addition, export earnings were badly affected since Russia 
was one of the major trading partners. However, the decline in GNP counterbalanced the decline in 
exports, oil prices as well as commodity prices, in fact contracting trade deficit. High interest rates and 
the decrease in the maturity of domestic debt, increased the cost of borrowing for the Treasury, 
increasing doubts as to debt servicing and debt sustainability. Plus, herding behavior by international 
investors placing Turkey in the same boat with Russia had increased bond spread in international 
markets, hence the country risk causing further decline in GNP in 1998. 
Moreover, in 1999, Turkey first was faced with general elections and later, with two devastating 
eartquakes, which worsened the fiscal balance even more, reinforcing the doubts of sustainability 
further with mounting public debt. In the face of growing problems, a new stabilization and 
disinflation program was called for. Before the implementation of the program, a new banking law 
was enacted in June. There were structural weaknesses in the banking sector, main one being the 
striking dichotomy between the private and the state banks.Even though the overall capital-adequacy 
ratio surpasses the minimum set by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, state commercial 
banks were undercapitalized. In addition, banks have experienced persistent losses and liquidity 
problems associated with direct lending at subsidized rates. In recent years, private banks have 
strengthened their capitalization, but had maturity mismatch between their assets and liabilities and 
had open foreign exchange positions. Keeping these weaknesses in mind, the newly enacted banking 
law later to be modified in December, established an independent regulatory and supervisory body   24 
called BRSA, which in addition to establishing rules and regulations for the compliance of banks to 
BIS standards, determined the rules for taking over failed banks. However due to delays in 
appointments of its board, BRSA did not start functioning till September 2000, and what is worse is 
that regulations related to risk management  procedures and restructuring of public banks had to wait 
till January 2001, i.e after the first crisis in November 2000. 
TABLE II 
MAIN INDICATORS 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Short Term Foreign Debt(Mio $)  17,072 17,691 20,274  22,  921 28,301 16,241 15,155 
            CBRT  984  889  905  686  653  590  470 
            Deposit Money Banks 8,419  8,503  11,159  13,172  16,900 7,997 5,705 
            Other Sectors  7,669 8,245 8,710 9,063 9,748 7,654 7,896 
Short term debt/ International 
Reserves 
68.3 65.1 70.4 67.9 82.8 53.8 39.9 
Current Acct Deficit/GNP  -1.3 -1.4  1.0 -0.7 -4.9  2.4 -1.0 
GNP growth  7.0 8.3 3.9  -6.1 6.3  -9.5 7.8 
Reer3
(1)  -1.26 13.85  4.31 -1.26 15.95  -21.02  8.08 
Cpi inflation  75.2 98.3 66.5 60.5 38.9  71.11  30.54 
Interest rates  132.2 106.8 115.5 104.6  36.2 99.57  63.5 
Domestic debt stock/GNP  21 21.4 21.7 29.3  29 69.2  55 
Source: Central Bank, BOP; SPO Main Economic Indicators 
(1) Real effective exchange rate index, IMF definition, 1995=100, positive implies appreciation of TL 
 
Turkey adopted its disinflation, stabilization and structural reform program after the elections in 1999 
in December, after the many failed ones and called this “disinflation program” for short, stressing  its 
seriousness in lowering the chronic high inflation it was suffering from for the last 20 years. IMF 
backed Turkish tablita of December 1999 with predetermined depreciations, quasi currency board 
rules and an announced exit strategy aimed at decreasing inflation through lowering of expectations 
and  of debt to GNP ratio. Program was successful in lowering interest rates immediately and meeting 
the monetary, exchange rate and public finance program targets, however, inflation was slower to 
decline than the interest rates due to high public sector price increase at the end of 1999. The 
slowdown in the second half of the year  of privatization as well as of structural reforms, together with 
widening of the current account deficit worsened expectations and eventually caused interest rates to 
rise again in late autumn. This was the trigger of the crisis. The liquidity squeeze forced one of the 
commercial banks to sell its huge portfolio of government securities, which triggered other sales, and   25 
big banks cut their credit lines, exacarbating the increase in interest rates further. Meanwhile, short 
term foreign debt  had risen to $28.3 billion (140% of foreign exchange reserves), from $22.9 billion 
in 1999  and  banks’ open positions increased amounting to $20-25 billion. Appreciation of the 
currency and the increase in  current account deficit from -0.7% of GNP in 1999 to -4.9% in 2000 and 
inability to decrease inflation in line with predetermined depreciations, had already created 
expectations regarding the unsustainability of the exchange rate regime and hence the program. The 
liquidity crisis and the turmoil in the financial markets, reinforced expectations along these lines 
further, necessitating emergency measures and  Turkey requested additional financial help from IMF. 
In December, a rescue package of additional $7.5 billion was promised in several installments, 
conditioned on  various reforms and measures which managed  to calm down the markets only till 
February of 2001.When the real full blown crisis hit in February, it created a much bigger turmoil than 
the first one, Central  Bank first sold  $7.5 billion foreign exchange in one day, then refused to provide 
TL liquidity to defend its FX reserves in the face of speculative attack which skyrocketed the interest 
rate and the liquidity squeze forced the banks to sell part of  those dollars back to the Central Bank, 
netting the amount of FX sold to $1.6 billion, but then, the next day Central Bank sold another $3.5 
billion to the banks, all this turmoil eventually forced the abondenment of the peg and of the program, 
letting Turkish Lira to float, after a 40% devaluation. The instability in the financial markets lasted till 
middle of May and the announcement  of the “Transition to Strong Economy” program together with a  
new letter of intent promising  major structural reforms and IMF approval of  program with additional 
support of $8 billion calmed down the markets. 
In retrospect, a weak banking system, maturity and currency mismatch, weak regulation and prudential 
measures, over reliance on short term inflows and procastination of structural reforms as well as 
outside factors such as increase in energy prices and appreciation of US dollar  vis-a vis Euro were the 
reasons for the failure of the program. The crisis weakened the banking sector further with the high 
devaluation and skyrocketing money market rates On the other hand, 2000-2001 crisis was useful in 
one respect that it helped to recapitalize some banks and shut down of the banks under tutelage which 
had strengthened the banking sector preventing it from another likely crisis due to an external shock 
like the war in Iraq. The problem however, was that saving the banks, at least the way it is done, 
resulted in increased the public sector debt, reinforcing the debt sustainability issue which it was trying 
to avoid.  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Capital mobility and the related issue of capital account liberalization became the subject of extensive 
discussions among economists, central bankers and international financiers in the aftermath of series 
of financial crises around the world in the late 1990s.   26 
The analysis in this paper demonstrated that the recent crisis starting with the East Asian crisis in 
1997, Brazil in 1999, Turkey in 2000–2001 had similar common causes. Fixed or predetermined 
exchange rates and high interest rates induced capital inflows and increased unhedged short term 
foreign debt. Currency appreciations, increasing current account deficits, weak fiscal stance with 
growing concerns about debt sustainability and a weak banking systems, or a combination of the one 
or few of the above assorted the picture in each case. In such an environment, sudden reversal of 
inflows inevitably sparked the crisis.  
The huge costs of these crisis and the inability of the experts to foresee its arrival indicated to the 
world that for a successful capital account liberalization, in addition to the standard sound 
macroeconomic policies and an orderly sequencing of liberalization arguments, efficiency and 
soundness of the financial sector with an effective banking supervision, improving corporate 
governance, transparency of the data and accounting practices, observance of prudential rules as well 
as enforcing fiscal reforms were the new important factors to be taken into account. 
The issue of capital controls is, indeed, the integral part of discussions of capital mobility and capital 
account liberalization. After all, if it is the reversal of capital flows which triggers a crisis, restricting 
the capital mobility should reduce the risk associated with capital flows and the consequences 
including the costs of their of sudden reversals. 
As a rule, controls are distortionary and second best and may increase the risk of relaxation of 
macroeconomic discipline but may be necessary to resort to in crisis times temporarily in markets 
which are not efficient 
Generally, outflow controls are thought to be curative, they help to avoid nominal exchange rate 
depreciation without tightening monetary policy or taking other stringent measures while inflow 
controls try to minimize appreciations without sacrifing monetary autonomy. 
Surprisingly, many who are against outflow controls because of its destabilizing effects, favor inflow 
controls, arguing that it is precautionary, unlike outflow controls which are resorted during or right 
before the crisis, signaling the worsening of a situation, in fact triggering the very panic they wanted to 
avoid. Personally, if I have to, I would choose inflow controls over that of outflow, from the point of 
view of future credibility, since it is more kosher to let somebody know the situation he is getting into 
beforehand, rather than after the fact  in which he would feel trapped.  
Chile first tried to solve her problems with capital controls instead of restructuring its economy and 
ended up in a disaster in 1982. However, learning from this experience Chile strengthened its banking 
sector in the next 10 years and managed to deal with capital inflows with the same restrictions during 
1991-1998 period much more successfully. Even though Chile is cited as success story in the inflow 
control literature, her earlier experience indicated that when controls are used as an alternative to 
making the necessary adjustments in the inconsistent policy mix, instead of reforming the banking   27 
sector and the fiscal area, it can lead to disaster. Malaysia, on the other hand was cited as another 
success story, managing to get out of crisis through outflow controls, however, it should be noted first 
that Malaysia when it exercised outflow controls, most of the foreign capital had already left the 
country. Even though, one has to give credit to Malaysian authorities for using their time effectively 
during the control period for making the necessary structural adjustments without the help of an IMF 
Program and synchronizing the controls well with lowering of the interest rates and strengthening the 
regulatory and prudential mechanisms, it should be noted that, the same contagion which caused 
Malaysia to be affected by the crisis, may have also helped its recovery, since Korea was already on its 
way to recovery with the IMF Program when Malaysia imposed its controls 14 months after the crisis. 
Also ,one should keep in mind that lowering of the US interest rates  was instrumental in the region to 
overcome the crisis. Hence, it is difficult to give all the credit just to outflow controls, in Malaysia's 
recovery. 
Capital controls can be detrimental if they are used to shelter the economy for along time while 
continuing the inconsistent fiscal and monetary policy mix which led to overvalued currency because 
the effects of such inconsistent policies will be costly in the long run (Krugman (1998)). It can also be 
harmful, if it is not  properly designed. One such example is the restriction on offshore borrowing by 
Korean corporations which contributed to the crisis in 1997. 
Reinheart and Smith(2001) argue  temporary controls are effective only if they are  "highly punitive 
and associated real interest rates are high" which imply large costs for the economy. Also a system like 
unremunerated reserve requirement if is in place for a relatively long period of time, it may encourage 
disintermediation. Those who can will try to avoid the cost imposed on them through higher interest 
rates by circumventing the banking system and may find different forms of financing like direct credit 
from the supplier etc. 
There are also macro costs associated with higher interest rates like lower investment and lower 
growth than would have existed had there be no such costs. Gallego et al (1999), argue that Chile 
would have grown half a percentage point more if there were no such policy mix and reserve 
requirement system. They also claim that, this system, by necessitating large reserve built up, to avoid 
appreciation of the exchange rate, created big burden on the central bank balance sheet, like .5% of 
GDP. 
County experiments indicate that controls by themselves are no solution to sudden reversals, may not 
even be effective in decreasing inflows unless accompanied by other supporting policies, but even 
when they are effective, it is temporary. If they are used to avoid making the necessary painful 
adjustments, they can be tremendously costly, while if they are used with the right type of policies and 
the time is used affectively to make the necessary structural transformations, they can be beneficial but   28 
again only temporarily, since due to evasions, their marginal utility declines and they have to be 
continuously monitored, revised and increase in scope to effectively deal with these evasions. 
Controls on inflows like in the case of Chile can help the Central Bank to undertake an independent 
monetary policy, but this does not work when there is a massive speculative attack, i.e when there is a 
large shock and when banking sector is weak and the accompanying policies are not supportive as was 
shown by the case of earlier control episode in Chile. Chile may have succeeded for a while with 
inflow restrictions in terms of shifting the composition of the inflows and maintaining monetary 
autonomy by raising interest rates which were helpful in reducing inflation. However, as inflows 
increased, higher amount of tax was required to do the same effect, and eventually in 1995, this policy 
was no longer effective. Mexico on the other hand did the same thing without recourse to any capital 
controls, in 1994 when faced with a speculative attack, by immediately recognizing the dimensions of 
the problem and taking necessary structural and policy measures. In this context, an interesting 
question comes to ones mind. Assuming that subsequent post-crisis policies are “right”, is the large 
rescue package like the one given to Mexico equivalent to capital controls in the sense  that it does the 
same job? 
Yes controls are transitory, has to be accompanied by right policies and are costly, but given the 
alternative; the cost of the crisis and the time and effort it takes to gain back the investor confidence, 
they can be resorted to till the new financial architecture is designed. In fact, the above question brings 
another controversial but related question into mind: should some form of transitory capital controls be 
incorporated in the IMF supported stabilization programs?  
The answer which follows from the analysis in this paper is that controls certainly can be considered. 
In this context, the Turkish experience with 1999 stabilization program and its collapse is illustrative. 
Basic ideas behind this Turkish program were undoubtedly right. However, the timing was off, and 
execution of program's non-monetary and non-exchange rate parts lack luster at best. Program 
envisaged the imposition of fiscal discipline –initially via extensive privatization program and a deep 
restructuring of banking system. However, these parts proved politically difficult to execute. 
Privatization run into all sorts of delays, leaving a budget gap which required increasing government 
borrowing. Similarly, the independent body in charge of banking sector reform, regulation and 
supervision did not become operational until after the November 2000 crisis. 
Due to the lack of deterrents and motivated by relatively fixed exchange rates, Turkish banks acquired 
large short term foreign liabilities which under the adverse conditions of late 2000 and early 2001 
affected the expectations regarding the sustainability of the exchange rate regime unfavorably. 
Eventually, Central Bank was left with no other choice than to float exchange rate and provide the 
additional liquidity to banking system i.e. the basic pillars of stabilization program had to be 
abandoned. The result was a deep financial and economic crisis.   29 
Given the experiences with Asia and Brazil crises, this problem was predictable. However, with the 
Turkish reality in 1999, the stabilization and disinflation program could not have been postponed till 
the functioning and efficient banking system is in place. But then, knowing the existing weaknesses of 
Turkish banking system and having the Asian experiences to learn from, perhaps the controls on short 
term capital inflows could have been imposed and vigorously enforced as a part of the program. It was 
shown above that effectiveness of inflow controls deteriorates over time. But time was exactly what 
was needed to restructure banking system and controls could have provided that time. 
Still, the recent worldwide financial crisis provided us new horizons which should be taken into 
account in designing the new financial architecture. 
First is that capital accounts should not be liberalized until the financial liberalization is completed 
and/or that it should be liberalized at a pace, consistent with the strength of the financial and banking 
system and their ability to handle rapid inflow and outflows. 
Also that a new awareness of the financial environment is needed, one that is based on risk. In addition 
to risk management at the enterprise level, macro risk management, where the total exposure of the 
country together with its private, government and nonfinancial sector had to be taken into account.  
Another important contribution of the recent crisis is the understanding that the risk takers should at 
least share the responsibility of the risks they are taking and it should not be born only by the 
borrowers and that involving the private sector in crisis resolution eases the burden of adjustment. As 
Stanley Fisher argues efficient operation of international system requires more private sector 
involvement in the prevention and resolution of financial crisis. In fact, Asian crisis taught the lesson 
that IMF supported programs is not automatic to gain private sector confidence. Additional act by the 
major creditor banks to keep their lines open, either by moral suasion as was the case in Korea or more 
voluntary like in the case of Brazil, was essential for these countries to recover from the crisis earlier. 
Yes restrictions lead to inefficiencies, however, till the international financial system becomes more 
efficient, it may not be a bad idea to consider temporary market based restrictions, for developing 
countries suffering from high interest rates and/ or those with high short term foreign debt, such as the 
Tobin tax or a version of it. Reserve requirements on inflows like the ones used in Chile, may not be 
used for countries like Turkey with high interest rates and high domestic debt, because it increases the 
interest rates, intermediation costs and the domestic debt even further, but, maybe a similar argument 
could be made for exchange rates. For a country like Turkey with high domestic debt, where the 
central bank intervention to limit the volatility of the exchange rate is ineffective against speculation 
arising from short term inflows and on the contrary, intervention itself is used as a speculation device 
to play around with the exchange rate, a different idea such as temporarily putting the exchange rate in 
a band where the limits of the band will be defended by taxing the violators, is worth thinking about. 
The idea of various sorts of bands for exchange rates were used by many countries so far, however, the   30 
novelty in this formulation I suggest, the country would determine a band for exchange rates where the 
limits of the band would be consistent with medium and long term sustainable current account deficit 
and anybody who goes beyond the limits of the band would be taxed, instead of Central Bank 
intervention to defend the band. This idea may work better, since not only the Central Bank will not 
lose its reserves, but the ones who drive the exchange rate outside of the band will collectively share 
the responsibility for it, following along the lines of recent burden sharing spirit as in the Brazilian 
crisis resolution. This way, Turkey can gain time to address the structural issues, which would be 
necessary for EU accession anyway, rather than dealing with the pain of exchange rate fluctuations. A 
similar idea can also be used to limit excessive short term foreign borrowing. Maybe to this end, an 
international body can put strict guidelines regarding the short term foreign liabilities, indicating above 
a certain percentage of the balance sheet or reserves as risky, given the standard flows as well as the 
stock imbalances of the country. In fact, it can employ the Tobin tax, for the levels beyond the risky 
critical limit, taxing both the borrower and the lender heavily and the proceeds from this tax can be put 
into a common fund and used to assist other countries who are on the right track but do not have the 
finances for it. The advantage of this system is that it can be applied by individual countries who want 
to clean their own backyard, while waiting for a new and improved international financial system to be 
operational. 
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